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STRICT LIABILITY OR LIABILITY BASED UPON
FAULT? ANOTHER LOOK
Frederick Davis*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Much of the current literature on tort law assumes the existence of
two independent and sometimes contradictory philosophies of liability-one based upon negligence, or fault, and the other simply based
upon the more limited question of the defendant's "causal connection"
with the injury.' The latter is often referred to as "strict" or "absolute"
liability, and is said to be the more time-honored theory, whereas liability based upon negligence, or fault, is said to be a relatively modern
innovation.2
Those who assert the relative modernity of fault as a criterion of
liability have increasingly fixed upon the opinion of Chief Justice Shaw
in the celebrated case of Brown v. KendallP as the fundamental articulation of this "modern" theory. Inasmuch as this decision was handed
down as recently as 1850, many scholars have questioned the propriety
of staking our fortunes on such an unseasoned philosophy.' A major
thesis of this article, however, is that fault, as a predicate of liability,
has far more venerable credentials than Brown v. Kendall, and that it
was at least an invisible or assumed element even in the simplistic formulas developed at early common law. A second thesis is that the differences between these supposedly antipodal philosophies, that is, between strict liability and liability based upon fault, are more theoretical
than real, and that judicial adoption of one or the other rationale results more from a perception of what is fair in the allocation of the
burden of proof than from a conscious judicial choice between compet-

* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. A.B., Yale University
(1948); J.D. with specialization in international affairs, Cornell University (1953); LL.M., Victoria University of Wellington, N.Z. (1955). Member, New York, Missouri, and Ohio Bars.
1. See, e.g., C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 547, 548 (2d
ed. 1969); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 137-42 (2d ed. 1977); Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the
Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963 (1981).
2. See authorities collected in Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 926 (1981). Professor Rabin is highly skeptical of the
simplistic assumptions commonly made about the relationships between fault and strict liability.
3. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
4. See, e.g.. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INSURY-NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES passim (1975); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation
and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967).
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ing jurisprudential theories.
In order to establish the validity of these theses it will be necessary
briefly to review some critical developments in the evolution of tort liability at common law; to dispute the common assumption that liability
based upon negligence evolved directly from the so-called "action on
the case"; to illustrate, through examples, how judges and legislators
are constantly adjusting the parities between given classes of plaintiffs
by subtle and sometimes unsubtle reassignments of the burdens of
proof; and, finally, to analyze a few of the more celebrated modern
examples of "strict liability" in order to suggest that they may well be
sailing under false colors.
II.

A.

SOME CRITICAL HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Early Restrictions on the Scope of Trespass

The historical evolution of the procedural rituals controlling access
to the courts by persons suffering tortious injury has been recounted
many times by diligent scholars.' The general view appears to be that
the early common-law judges discerned an extremely simple test for
discriminating between those injured persons who were eligible for judicial assistance in obtaining compensation and those who were not.
The test merely looked to whether the plaintiff's injury had resulted
from some force having been put into motion by an act of the defendant. If so, the circumstances neatly fitted into one of the writs of trespass, usually trespass vi et armis, and the case was judicially submissible.6 On the other hand, if the injury was the result of a mere
condition created by the defendant, the harm was said to have indirectly resulted, and there was no formula available to the plaintiff in
the form of any writ which would entitle the plaintiff to recover.7
The anomalies inherent in a criterion which distinguishes between
directly and indirectly inflicted injury, and which permits judicial redress only for the former, have been graphically detailed in a famous
article by Professor Charles Gregory.8 Making an implicit but obvious
5. See authorities collected in M.

FRANKLIN

& R.

RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT

LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 26, 27 (3d ed. 1983). See also James, Analysis of the Origin and Development of the Negligence Actions, reprinted in J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW,
No-FAULT AND BEYOND 42 (1975).
6. See authorities collected in W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1-4 (7th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER]. Trespass vi et
armis-trespass with force and arms-refers to the common-law action for injuries committed
with direct and immediate violence or force against one's person or property. BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 1348 (5th ed. 1979).
7. E. MORGAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW 79-81 (2d ed. 1948); T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 465-66 (5th ed. 1956).

8. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359 (1951).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/3
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analogy to the victims of racial discrimination, Professor Gregory identified those persons suffering from directly inflicted injuries as
"Whites," and those indirectly injured as "Blacks." ' His examples involved a beam which, in the case of White, the defendant had accidentally dropped upon White, with resulting injury to White. In the case
of Black, however, the same beam had been left lying in the roadway
by the defendant where Black, stumbling over it, sustained the exact
same injury as White had. White, having been injured directly by an
object put into motion by the defendant, could bring a writ of trespass
vi et armis, and was therefore entitled to pursue a judicial remedy.
Black, however, being unable to establish these conditions, and being
able only to show that he had been injured by a condition created by
the defendant, was not entitled to seek judicial relief. As we would say
today, Black was unable to "state a claim upon which relief could be
granted." As Professor Gregory put it:
Poor Black never could understand why White was allowed recovery and
he was denied it. Each had sustained the same hurt from the same unintended conduct of the same defendant-the dropping of the beam. The
only difference Black could perceive was that White was "lucky" enough
to get hit by the beam, so that he was allowed to ...[submit his case]
with no questions asked. 10
Although this early common-law technique for distinguishing between deserving and undeserving plaintiffs was invidiously discriminatory, it did have (unlike the patterns of racial discrimination to which
Professor Gregory made an implicit analogy) some conspicuous administrative advantages. For example, the causation issue, which has
proved particularly troublesome in our more sophisticated legal systems,"' was quickly and easily disposed of under this approach. If the
defendant had put into motion a force or an object which produced
injury, there was a submissible case, and the reasons or circumstances
surrounding the injury rarely mattered. If, on the other hand, the defendant had merely created a condition which, in combination with
other circumstances, produced injury, there was no liability exposure at
all.

9. Id. at 362-65.
10. Id. at 363.
11. A. BECHT & F.

MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND
STRICT LIABILITY CASES (1961); H. HART & A. HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959); Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J.87,
140-49; Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1958); Strachan, The

Scope and
Application of1984
the "But For" Causal Test. 33 MODERN L.
Published
by eCommons,
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386 (1970).
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Enter the Writ of Trespass on the Case

As workable and as administratively convenient as the distinction
was between directly and indirectly produced harm, it could not survive
the assaults of logic, even in a society far less democratic than the one
we enjoy today. And so beginning about the thirteenth century, the
courts developed the writ of "trespass on the case" in order to permit
those suffering injuries merely from conditions created by defendants
to state claims even though such defendants had not "directly" injured
the plaintiffs."'
Trespass on the case thereby reduced some of the discrimination
suffered by Professor Gregory's Blacks. Blacks could now recover just
as much money as Whites, even though they had merely stumbled over
the abandoned beams instead of being struck by them. The only difference was that because Blacks had to state claims in terms of trespass
on the case, they might also have to prove fault. Whites, on the other
hand, were permitted to continue the use of the traditional writ of trespass vi et armis, which did not impose such a proof requirement.
Despite the slight parity of recovery opportunity thereby introduced, the English judges continued steadfastly to adhere to the demar13
cation between directly and indirectly inflicted harm, and because
fault was emerging as a necessary element to the writ of trespass on the
case, it was arguable that Professor Gregory's Blacks were still not very
much better off. Various technical and procedural distinctions were
found to be applicable depending upon whether the action was "trespass" or "case." ' 14 Although there was no visible logic to the continued
maintenance of the distinction, its application appears to have caused
little difficulty until the late eighteenth century. By that time, however,
the permutations and combinations of human conditions generated a
tragedy to which the application of the hallowed distinction between
directly and indirectly produced harm proved conspicuously troublesome. The question surfaced in 1773 before the Court of Kings Bench
in the well-known case of Scott v. Shepherd.13
In Scott v. Shepherd, the plaintiff's eye had been put out by what

12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (4th ed. 1971). Trespass on the
case refers to the common-law cause of action for recovery from damages that are the indirect
results of the defendant's wrongful act, where there was no direct or immediate force involved.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1347 (5th ed. 1979).
13. See, e.g, the much-cited case of Reynolds v. Clarke, 92 Eng. Rep. 410 (1725).
14. See A. KIRALFY, POTTER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 298-99 (4th ed. 1962); T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 7, at 372-73; B. SHIPMAN, HAND-

BOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 83-98 (3d ed. 1923). As is commonly done, this article will
use the word "trespass" to refer to trespass vi et armis and "case" to refer to trespass on the case.
15. 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/3
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may be described as a firecracker (or "squib," as it was then called).
The defendant had put the firecracker into motion by lighting it and
throwing it from the street into what we might today call a shopping
arcade or enclosed mall. If the firecracker had simply landed immediately upon the plaintiff and put his eye out there would have been no
problem. The defendant would have been viewed as having put into
motion an object which had produced injury to the plaintiff--clearly a
situation which was appropriate for the traditional writ of trespass vi et
armis. The difficulty arose, however, because the firecracker had not
landed directly on the plaintiff; it had landed, instead, in the shop or
booth of someone named Yates who sold gingerbread. Another man
named Willis, who was in the shop at the time and who recognized the
danger of the thing, immediately seized the firecracker and tossed it
across the arcade where it landed in the shop of a competing gingerbread seller named Ryal. Ryal, being no more sympathetic to the
firecracker than Willis, in turn threw it into another part of the shopping area where it ultimately exploded in the face of the unfortunate
plaintiff.
Chief Justice Blackstone, logically and literally applying the traditional common-law rule, said that no action for trespass would lie because the formula was not satisfied. While the defendant may have
been responsible for creating a condition which was the ultimate cause
of the plaintiff's injury, he had not put into motion a force which was
the immediate and direct cause. For this reason Blackstone was of the
opinion that Scott had not stated a claim under the traditional common-law formula for trespass vi et armis.16 He was, however, outvoted
by his colleagues on the Court of Kings Bench-De Grey, Gould, and
Nares-all of whom concluded that the intervening actions of Willis
and Ryal were ancillary to the primary action of Shepherd and that
Scott, therefore, had been injured directly by an object put into motion
by Shepherd.1 7
The case of Scott v. Shepherd is significant not only because it is a
major decision dealing with the distinction between directly and indirectly produced harm, but also because it raised questions about the
logic, if any, for retaining the distinction. After all, if the main reason
for placing indirectly harmed plaintiffs in the same position as directly
harmed plaintiffs was to erase an illogical discrimination between
equally deserving claimants, what useful purpose could be served by
continuing to compel such plaintiffs to choose, at the risk of being nonsuited, between a "directly injured" or an "indirectly injured"
16.

Id. at 526-28.

17. by
Id.eCommons,
at 526, 528-29.
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characterization?
Although the earlier judges who had decreed that there should be
no distinction between those directly wronged and those indirectly
* wronged may not have fully perceived it, later judges were beginning to
discern that trespass on the case presented some policy problems that
were a little trickier than those faced when recovery was sought on a
straight trespass vi et armis theory. First, under trespass vi et armis
there was a clearly responsible defendant whose causal connection with
the injury, dropping the beam, was hardly ever in dispute. The rule
that where one of two innocent parties must bear the burden of a loss,
the person whose act was the immediate occasion of the loss should
8
assume it, seemed unassailably applicable. Hardly anyone stopped to
think that since injuries are occurrences which society deplores, the
person who caused them is implicitly blameworthy. Under trespass vi et
armis it was unnecessary to think about that issue because the identity
of the culprits and their causal involvement were clear.
Second, under trespass vi et armis there existed an automatic limitation on the duration of the defendant's liability exposure. Given the
limited technology of the era, the potential period of liability exposure
for one who put an object or force in motion was typically only a matter of minutes. The arrow must land fairly soon, the fist must hit quickly, and the'beam cannot keep falling forever. Potential defendants in
actions based upon trespass vi et armis never had to sit around for very
19
long wondering about their possible liability exposure. Either they
had directly injured somebody or they had not.
Under the writ of trespass on the case things were not that simple.
The defendant may have abandoned the beam in the highway in order
to rescue some third party from a highwayman. Or a flood may have
caused the abandoned beam to float to the location where it represented a peril to the plaintiff. Similarly, the beam may have lain in the
highway, overlooked by countless travelers for a number of years, only
to be stumbled over by Black who was traversing the highway at night
many years after the defendant had abandoned the beam.
Clearly the simplistic analysis necessary to determine liability
under trespass vi et armis created, if literally applied, an unacceptable
dimension of liability exposure in instances when the harm was indirectly suffered. In order to bring that liability exposure within acceptable limits, common-law judges, either consciously or unconsciously,
18. The maxim that a person acts at his or her peril was apparently adopted by a number of
eminent common-law authorities. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 82 (1881).
19. Even today, statutes of limitation applicable to intentional torts are typically shorter
than those applicable to negligence actions. See Davis, Tort Liability and the Statute of Limitations, 33 Mo. L. REv. 170 (1968).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/3
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began as early as the thirteenth century to permit defendants to escape
from liability under such circumstances if defendants could show that
they had been innocent of any wrongdoing. The wall which a defendant
had builtsome twenty years earlier in fact may have collapsed with
resulting injury to plaintiff, and no one could gainsay that but for the
condition created by the defendant, plaintiff would not have sustained
injury. But to impose liability under such fragile circumstances must
have seemed unfair to discerning judges, which accounts for the introduction of the seemingly new requirement-namely that the defendant
also be shown to have built the wall with less than due care. 0
But if parity were to be maintained between actions in trespass
and actions on the case, would it not follow that the same conditions
(i.e., the defendant's fault or the defendant's unlawful intention) be imposed upon those seeking damages for directly produced harm as are
imposed upon those seeking damages for harm indirectly produced?
Chief Justice Shaw recognized this need, and recast the requirements
for the modern equivalent of trespass vi et armis in his famous opinion
in Brown v. Kendall."1 Shaw ruled that even in the case of directly
inflicted harm, the defendant must be shown to have intended the
harmful contact, or at least to have negligently put into motion the
force which was the occasion of the plaintiff's injury.
The revisionist view of the requirements for the modern equivalent
of trespass vi et armis had the technical effect of reducing the liability
exposure of directly acting defendants. This conclusion is based upon
the assumption that blameworthiness was never a requirement for the
application of trespass vi et armis. However, that assumption is contradicted by the fact that no dramatic reordering of precautions on the
part of potential defendants or classes of defendants took place following the decision in Brown v. Kendall."' The relative calm with which

20. Professor Gregory seems to have assumed that, right from the very beginning, some
proof of blameworthiness was a requirement for the maintenance of trespass on the case. Gregory,
supra note 8, at 363-64. The truth probably is that there was little internal consistency in the
early cases because the problem was not perceived. Professor Schwartz's warnings about drawing
inferences from raw documents and isolated cases as being "perilous" is well-grounded. Schwartz,

Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth Century America: A Reinterpretation,90 YALE L.J.
1717, 1722 (1981).
21. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
22. Shaw's opinion in Brown v. Kendall was cited only 36 times in jurisdictions outside
Massachusetts during the 115 years following its issuance. SHEPARD'S MASSACHUSETrS CITATIONS, CASES 198 (1967). This relative lack of judicial attention bears comparison to the sensation
generated by the English decision of Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 508-14; Gregory, supra note 8, at 377. These sharply different
judicial reactions to what appear to be the leading opinions dealing with the tension between
negligence and so-called strict liability seem to endorse the view of Professor Schwartz that our
courts have
always preferred
some sort of blameworthiness as a basis for loss shifting, and that the
Published
by eCommons,
1984
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the opinion was received suggests that blameworthiness had always
been at least an inference drawn from the defendant's involvement with
the conditions producing the directly inflicted injury, and that Shaw
was merely reflecting a generally shared view that, under modern conditions, more positive evidence of some blameworthiness should be required for defendants to be held responsible for such directly inflicted
injuries.23
Early common-law judges who did not require the plaintiff to show
that the defendant was in any way culpable in order to proceed against
the defendant under trespass vi et armis may very well have been applying a policy analogous to that which gave rise to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. Under that latter doctrine the plaintiff need not identify
the specific act of negligence which caused the injuries if, generally
speaking, the injuries would normally not have occurred without some
sort of negligent conduct or omission, and if the defendant was in substantial control of the circumstances or conditions from which the injury arose.24 In permitting the plaintiff to recover from a defendant for
injuries directly inflicted by a force or an object put into motion by the
defendant, a similar inference of culpability was tacitly drawn from the
defendant's direct involvement and from a societal expectation that
such mishaps should not occur. The aphorism that "accidents don't
happen, they are caused," embodies the commonly shared notion that a
mishap can only result from some sort of blameworthy conduct.
When the injuries are indirectly inflicted, however, the defendant's
involvement and control are more tenuous, and an inference of culpability is more difficult to draw. This is why, in connection with trespass
on the case, common-law judges increasingly found it necessary for the
plaintiff to establish some element of culpability in addition to a causal
connection. But the ascendance of the fault component in trespass on
the case also compelled judges to explain why that same component
was not required in actions for directly inflicted harm under trespass vi
et armis. In Brown v. Kendall, Shaw made the requirement applicable
to both types of actions and shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff
25
irrespective of whether the harm was indirectly or directly inflicted.
What had previously been circumstantially inferred to the point that it
was not mentioned as a specific requirement, was now something that
big change in the nineteenth century was a rejection of traditional immunities in favor of expanded liability exposure. Schwartz, supra note 1.
23. Professor Rabin has forcefully questioned the assumption that "fault," as a condition to
liability, was a nineteenth century innovation formally enthroned by Brown v. Kendall. Rabin,
supra note 2.
24. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1075-92 (1956).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/3
25. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 298.
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had to be established as part of plaintiff's prima facie case. Some culpability had always been associated with the circumstances permitting
plaintiff to recover under either trespass vi et armis or case. The only
change Brown v. Kendall made had to do with proof and upon whom
the burden lay. Although articulating important changes in the proof
requirements associated with the actions descending from both trespass
and case, Brown v. Kendall was not the radical departure from common-law principles which some observers have claimed.
III. THE FALLACY OF THE "NEGLIGENCE/CASE" ANALOGY
Although most commentators have correctly emphasized that the
distinction between trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case was
that between directly and indirectly produced harm,2 6 a number of
judges, perhaps understandably, equated the modern distinction between negligently produced harm and intentionally produced harm to
the early common-law distinction between trespass and case. 2 However
erroneous, the assumption of this parallel was quite common up until
recent times. A good illustration is provided in an excerpt from the
well-known case of Ploof v. Putnam:

The claim is set forth in two counts. One in trespass, charging that the
defendant by his servant with force and arms wilfully and designedly
unmoored the sloop; the other in case, alleging that it was the duty of the
defendant by his servant to permit the plaintiff to moor his sloop to the
dock, and to permit it to remain so moored during the continuance of the
tempest, but that the defendant by his servant, in disregard of this duty,
negligently, carelessly and wrongfully unmoored the sloop.28
The damages claimed were for injuries resulting from the sloop
having been subjected to the storm. Whether those injuries were the
direct or indirect result of the acts of the defendant's servants presents
an interesting characterization choice; depending how one views it, either trespass or case would be appropriate. But the acts of the defendant's servants were the same, so it is clear that the assumption of the
attorneys drafting the claim was that if the acts were to be deemed
intentional, then trespass was appropriate, but if they were only negligent, then case was the theory. There are many other instances in
which the historic antecedent to the currently imposed liability for negligence is referred to as the action for trespass on the case.2
26. W PROSSER, supra note 12, at 29; Gregory, supra note 8, at 362-64.
27. See, e.g., Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 284, 363 A.2d 1, 11 (1975), appeal
dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976). Even Professor Schwartz agrees that, overall, the affiliation of
trespass on the case with negligence "seems fair." Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1725.
28. Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 474, 71 A. 188, 189 (1908).
E.g., Green v.1984
Donroe, 186 Conn. 265, 440 A.2d 973 (1982); Harper v. Regency Dev.
Published29.
by eCommons,
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In order fully to appreciate the relationships between trespass vi et
armis, trespass on the case, intentionally inflicted harm, and negligence, the following chart may be helpful. The chart assumes that the
plaintiff sustained injuries from a golf ball over which the defendant
had custody and hypothesizes five different sets of circumstances. As
the chart indicates, following the circumstances under which recovery
would be permitted in Brown v. Kendall," modern tort law would permit liability to be imposed in only three of those cases.
The chart demonstrates the thesis of this article: that early common law would have allowed liability to be imposed in the instance of
the golf ball carefully but accidentally driven into the plaintiff, because
of the irrebuttable presumption that the defendant, under those circumstances, was somehow blameworthy. In the fifth instance, where
the golf ball unaccountably explodes and causes injury to the plaintiff,
it is doubtful whether many common-law judges, even in the earliest
days of the action on the case, would have permitted liability to be
imposed. Nevertheless, given the widely held assumption that fault was
never a requirement for liability until the nineteenth century, the defendant would be technically subject to liability.
golf ball
accidentally
but carefully
driven into
the plaintiff

golf ball unintentionally
but carelessly
driven into the
plaintiff

golf ball
deliberately
driven into
the plaintiff

TRESPASS VI ET ARMIS OR EQUIVALENT

IBATTERY

I

golf ball left
on seat of car
where it unaccountably explodes, with
resulting
injury to
plaintiff who
is passenger

golf ball
carelessly
left on a
path and
plaintiff
stumbles over
it and is
injured

TRESPASS ON THE CASE

NEGLIGENCE

I

Chart illustrating the different types of injury-producing circumstances covered by the
early common-law writs as compared to those covered under the modern theories of
battery and negligence

As the chart indicates, the theoreticalliability exposure of injuryproducing defendants has been reduced under modern tort law.
Whether that liability exposure has in fact been reduced depends upon
whether we believe that common-law judges consistently permitted reCo., 399 So. 2d 248, 250 (Ala. 1981); Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc., 293 Ala. 56, 60, 300
So. 2d 94, 96 (1974) (citing material from appellants' brief); Smitherman v. Superior Court, 102
Ariz. 504, 433 P.2d 634 (1967).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/3
30. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
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covery under the writ of trespass on the case when the defendant was
in no way blameworthy. The chart also exposes the fallacy that "negligence" descends from trespass on the case. Because modern tort law
makes a categorical election on the basis of the state of mind of the
defendant,3 1 its coverage is quite different from the earlier law which
made that election on the basis of the actual physical circumstances
accounting for the injury, a defendant-created "condition," or an object
put into motion by the defendant.3
Despite that difference, the early common law's concentration
upon the circumstantial origins of the injury-producing events can also
be viewed simply as a means of avoiding the need for proof of blameworthiness. Issues of culpability seem to have been subsumed through
unspoken inferences derived from the circumstances. In this light the
supposedly different doctrinal bases for liability which are commonly
asserted as features of modern tort law may also be better explained
and understood in terms of inferences and proofshifting, and it is to
that task that the discussion will now turn.
IV.

JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ADJUSTMENTS OF Loss SHIFTING
THROUGH CHANGES IN THE BURDEN OF PROOF

The argument that liability exposure is frequently expanded or
narrowed by judicially imposed shifts in the burden of proof oftentimes
camouflaged in terms of doctrinal distinctions can be amply supported
by reference to a number of historically celebrated decisions and by a
few modern examples.
The well-known seventeenth century case of Weaver v. Ward8 is
frequently singled out as evidence of a shift in judicial philosophy.
Weaver had been injured directly by a musket discharged by Ward.
The applicable writ of trespass vi et armis clearly would have permitted the submission of the case on those laconic facts alone, and, in fact,
the plaintiff did prevail. Nevertheless, the opinion approved of that triumph in terms of the failure of the defendant to allege freedom from
fault with sufficient clarity to overcome a demurrer. The defendant had
merely alleged that the shooting was accidental, unfortunate, and
against his will. The court held that such allegations, if proved, would
still be insufficient to support an inference that the defendant was faultless. The opinion thus reveals that some fault on the part of the defendant was always assumed from the circumstances which generated an
injury actionable under trespass vi et armis, and that if the defendant's

31. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 140.
32. See supra text accompanying note 7.
80 Eng. Rep. 1984
284 (K.B. 1616).
Published33.
by eCommons,
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innocence could be established, the action would not lie. It is noteworthy, however, that the plaintiff still did not have to offer proof of
blameworthiness-that issue was seemingly presumed. But, if the defendant could prove that he was not blameworthy, then presumably liability would not be imposed. If the defendant's allegations had, in fact,
somehow met the test imposed by that seventeenth century Court of
Kings Bench, the demurrer would have been overruled, and the defendant would have had the burden of proving absence of blameworthiness. With sufficient proof on that issue adduced, the plaintiff would no
longer have been able to rely upon the circumstantial assumption, and
would have been put to the test of proving that the defendant was not
innocent, but, in fact, was at fault.
The law of Weaver v. Ward was applied by the trial court in the
Massachusetts case of Brown v. Kendall. The plaintiff had been injured
by the defendant who had apparently struck the plaintiff with a stick
while attempting to break up a dog fight. The trial court instructed the
jury that on those facts they could find for the plaintiff unless the defendant could establish that he had been exercising extraordinary care,
or that the injury was somehow attributable to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff." As in Weaver v. Ward, the court was willing to
permit the jury to draw some inference of wrongdoing from both the
fact of injury and from the fact that the injury had resulted from some
direct action on the part of the defendant. However, consistent with the
qualification made in Weaver v. Ward, the trial court was willing to
permit the jury to exonerate the defendant if the defendant could prove
that he was free from fault.3 5
In the historic opinion by Chief Justice Shaw, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the lower court and redefined
where the burden of proof lay. The court ruled that the plaintiff would
no longer be entitled to the inference of wrongdoing which the circumstances of the injury would formerly have permitted, but would have to
establish some fault or unlawful intention on the part of the
defendant.""
The change made in the transition from Weaver v. Ward to Brown
v. Kendall involved a shift in the burden of proof, and not in the theory
of liability. This is why it is technically incorrect to identify Weaver v.
Ward as an example of "early common law strict liability. '3 7 Because

34. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). Chief Justice Shaw's opinion recites the instructions of
the trial court, which were in remarkable accord with the law of Weaver v. Ward. Id. at 293-94.

35. Id. at 294.
36. Id. at 298.
37. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 15. But see Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/3
the History of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1 (1970). Professor Malone makes a
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it recognized the fault issue as decisive when raised by the defendant,
the opinion in Weaver v. Ward validates the observation that fault had
always been an implicit assumption of the circumstantial formula necessary to the issuance of the writ of trespass vi et armis, even though it
was not an element of plaintiff's prima facie case unless and until proof
of innocence (of a type beyond that offered in Weaver v. Ward) was
established by the defendant.
In this light, Brown v. Kendall was nothing more than another
step in a procedural evolution, the effect of which was to make it more
difficult for injured plaintiffs to recover. This procedural evolution involved the sequential imposition of specific proof requirements upon
plaintiffs with respect to issues which, at early common law, had either
been ignored or subsumed by the facts. Like the processes of natural
evolution, this procedural evolution has never moved evenly on all
fronts. Even as late as the 1950's, the English courts had not fully
moved away from the view that when the action lies in trespass (as
opposed to case) the actor's fault is presumed and, if liability is to be
avoided, the actor has the burden of proving innocence. In 1959, however, in Fowler v. Lanning, the Queen's Bench Division in effect repudiated Weaver v. Ward and lined up with the position taken by Shaw in
Brown v. Kendall: namely that in an action for trespass, fault or intention to cause contact would no longer be presumed but must be
proved.39
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may also be viewed as a device
for retaining, under limited circumstances, the pre-Brown v. Kendall
view that the circumstances of the injury presuppose some fault on the
part of the defendant. Although the status of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur has been the subject of some extended and lively debates,40 it
can be said with some confidence that when the circumstances suggest
that the plaintiff's injury was the result of a limited number of possible
but different negligent acts or omissions on the part of the defendant,
res ipsa loquitur excuses the plaintiff from pleading and proving exactly
convincing case for the proposition that the significance of Weaver v. Ward has been greatly overrated, and that the court really didn't mean what it said in its now famous dictum. Pointing out
that no defendant, in the 300 years following the decision in Weaver v. Ward, had ever been able
to avoid liability through proof of innocence, Professor Malone opines that when the court said
"no man shall be excused of a trespass . . . except it may be judged utterly without his fault,"
it
meant that no man shall be excused of a trespass unless he did not intend the act which produced
the trespass. He cites the examples quoted in the opinion as supporting his view. id. at 17-19.
38. [1952] 1 Q.B. 426.
39. Id.
40. Compare Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquiturin California, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 183 (1949) with
Jaffe, Res
Ipsa Loquitur1984
Vindicated, 1 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1951).
Published
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which negligent act or omission produced the injury.41 Courts have always been disposed to relieve the plaintiff from an impossible burden of
proof by permitting the plaintiff to rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa
4
loquitur, when, of course, the circumstances are appropriate .
Morever, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the jury is permitted
to discredit evidence of innocence which the defendant may introduce
and still base a verdict on the inference from the circumstances that
the defendant was guilty of a discrete, if unidentified, negligent act. 3
In Cohen v. Petty," the plaintiff was seeking recovery for injuries
sustained when a car driven by the defendant left the highway and hit
an embankment. Plaintiff apparently tried her case on a theory derived
from the pre-Brown v. Kendall era of Weaver v. Ward as she failed to

offer any evidence of actionable negligence or to plead the application
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.4 5 The defendant offered evidence, to
some degree ratified by the plaintiffs own testimony, that he had been
the subject of an unforeseeable fainting spell and that this accounted
for the loss of control over the vehicle. The trial court, in effect, directed a verdict for the defendant and this was affirmed on appeal."
Cohen v. Petty illustrates how Weaver v. Ward might have been
decided had the defendant's allegations of innocence in the latter case
reached the same compelling level that the defendant's proof of innocence reached in Cohen v. Petty. However, since the circumstances in
Cohen v. Petty appear to meet the requirements for the application of
res ipsa loquitur, plaintiff would clearly have been better off submitting
her case under that theory. The inference of fault, which the jury may
draw from the circumstances when res ipsa loquitur applies, 47 can still
support a jury verdict for the plaintiff even when the defendant offers
41. E.g., McDowell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 S.W.2d 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
(serious damage to subscriber's ear from sharp noise emanating from defendant's telephone lines).
42. E.g., Niman v. Plaza House, Inc., 471 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. 1971). See 38 Mo. L. REV.
147 (1973).
43. Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1044 (1968).
44. 65 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
45. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant "failed to exercise reasonable care" but her evidence
was only that "the automobile suddenly swerved out of the road." Id. at 820-21.
46. Id. For some years there was a division of authority concerning the submissibility of an
action by a passenger against the driver in a one-car accident situation on a res ipsa loquitur
theory. Compare Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 196 N.E. 36 (1935) with Whitley v. Hix, 207
Tenn. 683, 343 S.W.2d 851 (1961). The overwhelming majority of courts today permit such cases
to be submitted on a res ipsa loquitur theory provided there is sufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that the defendant was driving. See, e.g., Badela v. Karpowich, 152 Conn. 360, 206
A.2d 838 (1965) (res ipsa loquitur applied, but not mentioned in opinion); Johnson v. Foster, 202
So. 2d 520 (Miss. 1967); Lent v. Lent, 543 S.W.2d 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Tompkins v. Northwestern Union Trust Co., 645 P.2d 402 (Mont. 1982).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/3
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probative and compelling evidence of due care. Thus, if the plaintiff
had argued that res ipsa loquitur supported an inference that defendant
was negligent in Cohen v. Petty, the trial court was at least arguably
not as free to direct a verdict as it found itself when the plaintiff offered no evidence identifying a basis upon which the defendant might
be viewed as negligent.4
A further example of how balances may be tipped to favor or inhibit loss shifting by switching burdens of proof is provided by a significant contemporary repudiation of a fundamental rule ordained by
Shaw in Brown v. Kendall. In that opinion, Shaw not only declared
that the plaintiff must sustain the burden of proving some culpability,
but also that the plaintiff must establish that he or she was free from
contributory negligence as well.4 9 This ruling considerably reduced the
liability exposure of injury-producing defendants by imposing a significant proof adduction duty on plaintiffs who might, in many circumstances, be unable to meet such an obligation. In fact, in wrongful
death cases, many jurisdictions were compelled to generate some engaging if unrealistic fictions in order to make any wrongful death case
submissible under that harsh rule.50
Although a number of influential jurisdictions remained faithful to
Shaw's ruling through the first half of the twentieth century, it was not
universally accepted. Today, either by legislation or judicial repeal,
Shaw's ruling that the plaintiff must establish freedom from contributory negligence is no longer the law anywhere." This phenomenon evidences a widely shared sentiment that a reassignment of the burden of
proof was needed because too many deserving plaintiffs had been unable to recover when they were saddled with the task of pleading and
proving freedom from contributory negligence.
Despite this formal de jure repudiation of the rule in Brown v.
Kendall that the plaintiff must plead and prove freedom from contributory negligence, the rule indirectly survives in one of the more controversial areas of tort law, that of the liability of the landowner towards
land entrants. Although major attention has been given to the illogic of
measuring the defendant's liability exposure in terms of the status of
the land entrant (trespasser, licensee, or invitee), 2 a close study of the
48. It is conceivable that the court might have permitted this case to go to the jury on the
basis of circumstantial evidence (defendant was driving when the car suddenly left the road),
which is what the Connecticut court did in Badela, 152 Conn. 360, 206 A.2d 838. The only
problem was that the plaintiffs own testimony tended to support the defendant's theory that the
cause of the accident was sudden illness rather than negligence. Cohen. 65 F.2d at 820-21.
49. Brown v. Kendall. 60 Mass. at 297.
50. Davis, Wrongful Death, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 327, 358 (collecting cases).
51.

W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 597.

52. Rowland v. Christian, 60 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); W.
Published by eCommons, 1984
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reported decisions will indicate that the judicial imposition of an obligation to plead and prove a freedom from "look out" contributory negligence is a far more serious obstacle to judgment-seeking plaintiffs
than their status assignment. 8 In these so-called "slip-fall" cases the
plaintiff is typically injured by an encounter with a dangerous condition
on the land of the defendant. Almost all courts require, however, that
the plaintiff establish that the injury-producing condition was not read4
ily observable to the plaintiff or to a person exercising ordinary care.
This curious exception to the general rule that the burden of
pleading and proving contributory negligence is on the defendant has
excited surprisingly little attention. What seems clear, however, is that
judges have recognized that in this category of cases plaintiffs would be
unfairly advantaged if the defendant were consistently saddled with the
task of proving that the condition was open and obvious, and that a
more equitable parity in the loss-shifting process would result if plaintiffs were compelled to account for why they failed to avoid encountering the injury-producing condition in such cases.
Another deviation from the general burden of proof assignments
ordained by Brown v. Kendall can be found in the dog-bite cases.
Again, a judicial sympathy for the predicaments of dog owners may
have compelled an unorthodox assignment of proof responsibilities, but
anyone who has tried a dog-bite case knows that such a case is trickier
than the normal personal injury suit. 65 Although some courts have declared that they do not adhere to the rule that "every dog is entitled to
its first bite," such courts may produce the same result by requiring, as

PROSSER, supra note 6, at 522-23.
53. See, e.g., Moran v. Hartenback, 423 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). The court held
that even though the skylight repairman was an "invitee" or "business visitor," the defendant was
not liable when the danger was obvious to the person injured. Id. at 56-57.
54. Leslie Four Coal Co. v. Simpson, 333 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. 1960); Nance v. Ames Plaza,
Inc., 177 Neb. 88, 128 N.W.2d 564 (1964); Crenshaw v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 72 N.M.
84, 380 P.2d 828 (1963); Farley v. Portland Gas & Coke Co., 203 Or. 635, 280 P.2d 384 (1955);
Villano v. Security Say. Ass'n, 268 Pa. Super. 67, 407 A.2d 440 (1979) (contributory negligence
as a matter of law). But see Wilk v. Georges, 267 Or. 19, 514 P.2d 877 (1973) (defendant could
be found negligent in not anticipating that plaintiff might be oblivious of both warning signs and
the existence of a perilous surface). Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that his or her obliviousness to the obvious danger was justified. Harbourn v. Katz Drug Co.. 318 S.W.2d 226 (Mo.
1958). See also Christensen v. Murphy, 296 Or. 610, 678 P.2d 1210 (1984) (overruling Spencer
v. B.P. John Furniture Corp., 255 Or. 359, 467 P.2d 429 (1970), which had established landowner
immunity for injuries sustained by public officers on the premises). Missouri is typical, and has
incorporated this requirement into its mandatory jury instruction in such cases, an element of
which requires the jury to find that the "plaintiff did not know and by using ordinary care could
not have known of this condition." MISSOURI SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MISSOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 193 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as JURY
INSTRUCTIONS].
55. See, e.g., Sayers v. Haushalter, 493 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/3
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a condition of liability, that the plaintiff establish that prior to the bite
which is the subject of the suit, the owner had knowledge of the dog's
vicious propensities." While the plaintiff who is able to establish such
pre-bite knowledge on the part of the owner enjoys a release from the
need to prove negligence,5 7 the owner still can assert as a defense that
the plaintiff's encounter with the dog was the result of some intervening
action for which the owner was not responsible.58
On the other hand, when the injury-producing encounter is with
an animal less favored by judicial sentiments, there is an opposite tendency to shift the burden of proof on the fault issue back to the owner.
For example, a Missouri statute makes owners of animals strictly liable
for damages inflicted upon the person or property of another as a result
of an encounter on a public highway, but owners are permitted to exonerate themselves by establishing that it was through no fault of their
own that the animal escaped from confinement and was wandering on
the highway. 59 This statutory provision is a classic modern replay of the
proof assignments established by the medieval case of Weaver v.
Ward." As with the situation in Weaver v. Ward, however, it would be
incorrect to refer to this statutorily imposed liability as "strict." All
that the Missouri statute has done has been to reassign the burden of
proof in response to a legislatively perceived need for a better balance
between claimants and loss inflicters in this limited situation.
The most significant arenas in which proof reassignments have
been imposed, however, are those involving "abnormally dangerous activities," the manufacture and sale of products, and multiple potentially-responsible defendants. The first two categories are commonly described as "exceptions" to the general theory of liability based upon
negligence, 1 and are frequently referred to as examples of "strict" or
"absolute" liability.6 2 While the third category is generally not labeled
in those terms, recent developments indicate a close linkage between

56.

L.

REV.

See, e.g., Gardner v. Anderson, 417 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). See also 33 Mo.

99 (1968).

57. Boosman v. Moudy, 488 S.W.2d 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). See also W.
note 6, at 708.
58. Wendland v. Akers, 356 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
59. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 270.010 (Vernon 1963).
60. 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).

61.

See, e.g., C.

GREGORY

& H.

KALVEN,

PROSSER,

supra

supra note 1, at 547.

62. The assumption that "strict" liability and "absolute" liability are synonomous is contradicted by a significant number of decisions which specifically declare that when it comes to liability for defective products, "strict" liability is much narrower in scope and permits defenses not
available when the liability is "absolute." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 879
(Alaska 1979); Vineyard v. Empire Mach. Co., 119 Ariz. 502, 581 P.2d 1152 (Ct. App. 1978);
Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Il1. 2d 26, 37, 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (1980). See also German,
Seller Beware-Strict Liability but Not Absolute Liability, 37 INs. CouNs. J. 44 (1970).
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that category and the first two,"3 and it seemed advantageous to consider all three in a single discussion.
V.

STRICT LIABILITY "EXCEPTIONS" FROM GENERAL NEGLIGENCE
THEORY: ARE THEY REALLY "EXCEPTIONS"?

Modern theories of strict or absolute liability are commonly traced
to the celebrated English decision of Rylands v. Fletcher." Some
chroniclers have discovered that a satisfaction of Parkinson's law that
"work expands to fill the time available" 65 can readily be achieved
through a laborious review of the case law in order to determine which
American jurisdictions have accepted Rylands, which have rejected it,
and which, whether or not rejecting it by name, have nevertheless accepted it under a different label." Few scholars have bothered to note,
however, that Rylands v. Fletcher can easily be viewed as a modern
application of the early common-law formula for determining when
losses can be shifted under the writ of trespass vi et armis, although
limited to landowners who have sustained damages to their property as
a result of an activity engaged in by another landowner.
Like the law of nuisance, however, the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher
has a much more claimant-favoring application than the rule of
Weaver v. Ward." The latter decision, albeit by way of dictum, declared that defendants might exonerate themselves by proving that the
injury resulted from no fault of their own. The law announced in Rylands v. Fletcher, as well as the law of nuisance, offers no such escape,
and it is that feature of the ruling which has doubtless moved so many
judges and academics to characterize it as an example of strict or absolute liability.
Nevertheless, other aspects of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher suggest that underneath it all there are presumed elements of culpability
for which the judges were unwilling to search and which they were
even less willing to identify. That such an assumption of blameworthiness (whether conscious or unconscious) is nevertheless present, is
clearly revealed by the willingness of the English courts, as well as at
least one American court, to exonerate a defendant otherwise liable
under the Rylands rule or the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520,68

63.

Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share
Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1981).
64. 1 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
65. Parkinson, Parkinson's Laws, 5 S.D.L. REV. 1 (1960).
66. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 513.
67. 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).

68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/3
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if, in addition to the defendant's conduct, an act of God or vis major
combines with the defendant's activity to produce the injury. 9
A simple example should make the point. Defendant A uses dynamite for blasting. A is liable to the plaintiff for damages to the land of
the plaintiff resulting from such blasting, no matter how carefully carried on. Defendant B stores dynamite on his land and it explodes as a
direct result of being struck by lightning during the course of a thunderstorm. Under the English view and the view of at least one American jurisdiction, defendant B is not liable to the plaintiff, even though
the damages to the land are identical to those which plaintiff sustained
as a result of A's activities.
In each case the defendant's conduct was a cause in fact of the
plaintiff's injuries. That is, but for the bringing of the dynamite onto
their respective lands, the damage to the plaintiff would not have occurred. Why, then, should one defendant be exonerated whereas the
other will be held responsible? The only explanation (since the causal
involvement of each is identical) is that B is more innocent than A and
for this reason should be relieved of liability. But, since innocence is the
reciprocal of culpability, it follows that A is somehow more culpable
than B, and therefore should be held responsible, even though the liability imposing formula renounces fault as a criterion.
To be sure, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 522 rejects the
notion that the operation of a force of nature relieves a person engaging
in an abnormally dangerous activity from liability.7 ° But even the authors of the Restatement cannot carry their "no fault" premise to its
full logical extent, and so they express no opinion concerning the liability of the persons engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity when
the injury results from that activity combined with the intentional action of a third party." Since there is no question concerning the causal
connection between the injury and the abnormally dangerous activity,
one may legitimately ask why the Restatement authors expressed dubi-

69. Nichols v. Marsland, 2 Exch. D. 255, 260 (1876) (Baron Bramwell: "I am by no means
sure that if a man kept a tiger, and lightning broke his chain, and he got loose and did mischief,
that the man who kept him would not be liable."); Golden v. Amory, 329 Mass. 484, 109 N.E.2d
131 (1952). Other cases supporting the view that a vis major exonerates the defendant are collected in W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 732.
70. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977). The late Dean Prosser chided the
position taken by the Restatement as unsupported by any substantial authority. W. PROSSER,
supra note 12, at 521.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 caveat (1977). In a leading case, one court
has taken the position that a deliberate act taken by someone other than the defendant which
brings about the very harm considered to justify characterizing the activity as "abnormally dangerous" should exonerate the defendant who is carrying on the abnormally dangerous activity.
Pecan Shoppe v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 573 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
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ety, in this situation, about the liability of the person engaging in the
abnormally dangerous activity. It is obvious, moreover, that the Restatement authors were making a distinction based upon relative culpability because the substantiality of the combining event is not weighed.
The intentional conduct of a third party is sufficiently reprehensible to
raise a doubt about the wisdom of retaining the liability exposure of the
person engaging in the abnormally dangerous activity, but when the
injury results from a purely negligent action of a third party, the liability exposure of the person engaging in the abnormally dangerous activity remains fixed. 2 Since the single factor effecting an immunity on the
part of any person engaging in an otherwise injury-producing abnormally dangerous activity is the high degree of culpability of the intentionally acting third party, the only explanation for that immunity is
the relative "innocence" of the person engaging in that activity as compared to the deliberate act of the third party. Again, however, as innocence is the reciprocal of culpability, it is clear that persons engaging in
that abnormally dangerous activity are, at least implicitly, considered
reproachable. This is because their liability exposure is retained when it
is joined with conduct of less serious culpability. 3
In this light, so-called "strict" or "absolute" liability is really liability without the need to prove fault, although it is somewhat more
fixed than the liability without the need to prove fault exemplified by
the decision in Weaver v. Ward,7 4 in that proof of innocence, no matter
how convincing or persuasive, is no justification or excuse. Nevertheless, in England and in Massachusetts, if defendants engaging in the
conduct can establish that the injury was also triggered by a force of
nature, they will be excused.7 5 Finally, even the Restatement (Second)
might allow relative innocence to excuse liability if defendants can
show that the injury was caused not only by their engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity, but also by the intentional action of a
third party.7
When attention is shifted to product liability under the principles

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 522 comment a (1977).
73. Id. The English cases exhibit a curious inversion of the American view, at least insofar
as the Restatement (Second) of Torts represents the American view. Whether it be an animal or a
condition on the land, the vis major will exonerate the defendant. Baker v. Snell, [19081 2 K.B.
825, 833-34 (Farwell, J.). However, the malicious act of an intervening third party will exonerate
the defendant as regards a condition on the land. Rickards v. Lothian, 1913 A.C. 263 (P.C.). But
the malicious intervening act of a third person may not exonerate a person who keeps a wild
animal. Baker v. Snell, 2 K.B. at 833-34 (Farwell, J.).
74. 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).
75. See supra text accompanying note 69.
76. See supra text accompanying note 71.

72.
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announced under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,7
it becomes increasingly clear that here, as well, the new rules of liability exposure result more from shifts in the burden of proof than from
any real fundamental change in judicial philosophy.
Let us begin with a quick look at the so-called "production" or
"manufacturing" defect cases. In such cases, an unexplained fortuity
has resulted in the manufacture and sale of an injury-producing product, which injury has directly resulted from a shortcoming in the product not present in other products of the same line. 6 In these cases the
liability imposed by section 402A is not unlike the liability imposed
under res ipsa loquitur. The plaintiff is unable to identify the negligent
act or omission which caused the defect, but the circumstances clearly
suggest that something went amiss. Again, the inference is that "accidents don't happen, they are caused." The only real difference between
res ipsa loquitur and section 402A is that the latter relieves the plaintiff
of the necessity of alleging any negligence on the part of the defendant.7 9 But in two other respects the plaintiff enjoys significant advantages under section 402A. The defendant may not offer proof of innocence or due care, which is traditionally permitted under res ipsa
loquitur. 80 Moreover, the defendant may not raise the defense of contributory negligence under section 402A.8 1 Nevertheless, the fault issue
remains a hidden component even in the manufacturing or production
defect cases under section 402A and subtly influences the deciding authority on both the defect and causation issues. If it were truly "strict"
liability the plaintiff would be able to state a claim any time a product-

77.

Section 402A states that:

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if,
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See also Davis, Product Liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Model Uniform Product Liability Act,
16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513 (1980).
78. Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 343 (1974).
79. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Krauskopf, Products Liability, 32
Mo. L. REV. 459 (1967).
80. McKassen v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 12 Ill. App. 3d 429, 299 N.E.2d 38 (1973).
81. RESTATEMENT (SEcoiN) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965). For a criticism of the
methodology by which this rule was "restated" see Davis, supra note 77, at 535-36.
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connected injury were sustained.
The so-called "design" defect cases make it clearer that fault remains a predicate of liability even though it was theoretically abolished
by the language of section 402A. Authorities generally agree that the
test employed here is basically a negligence test,8" and the two federally proposed codes for dealing with the problem make this explicit.8 3
Unlike the production and manufacturing defect cases, the design defect cases do not involve a product which is deficient when compared to
other products in the same manufacturing line. The design defect cases
implicate the entire line of products. 8 The test used to determine
whether a product has been defectively designed is whether a reasonable person would put the product into the stream of commerce if he or
she had knowledge of its harmful character. 85 The failure to do what a
reasonable person would do under the same or similar circumstances is,
of course, the standard test for negligence. 86 What, then, is the difference between a case tried under negligence theory and a case tried
under section 402A when the injury-producing circumstances involve a
defectively designed product?
Again we see that the differences are not so much in the theories
of liability as they are in the allocations of the burden of proof. The
defendant is not permitted to offer proof of innocence (due care) when
the case is tried under section 402A, but, of course, in refuting the
plaintiff's explanation of how the injury occurred (causation), the defendant will be able to introduce evidence which may significantly affect the jury's sentiments on that point.8 7 Again, under section 402A
the defendant may not assert the plaintiff's contributory negligence as
a defense.8 8 More significant in defective design cases tried under section 402A, however, is the manner in which the negligence issue (would
a reasonable person with knowledge of its harmful character have put
the product into the stream of commerce?) is handled. Instead of requiring the plaintiff to establish that proposition, as required by the

82.

Fischer, supra note 78, at 340; Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability,

61 TEX. L. REV. 777 passim (1983). See also

MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB.

ACT Analysis (Depart-

ment of Commerce 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 62, 723-26.
83. MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT §§ 104(B), (C) (Department of Commerce 1979), 44
Fed. Reg. 62, 714 (1979); S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(b) (1982).
84. Fischer, supra note 78, at 343.
85. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (announcing standard and collecting authorities).
86. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 150; JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 54, at 118 (Supp.
1978).
87. See, e.g., Brown v. General Foods Corp., 117 Ariz. 530, 573 P.2d 930 (1978) (quality
control procedures admissible to rebut proof that moldy banana fragment was encased in Grape
Nuts box).
88. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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tradition verified in Brown v. Kendall, we find, in classic Weaver v.
Ward style, the defendant charged with the responsibility of establishing innocence. The classic announcement of this shift in the burden of
proof was made in the well-known California case of Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co.:"0
[W]e conclude that once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that
the injury was proximately caused by the product's design, the burden
should appropriately shift to the defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that the product is not defective. 90
Another development clearly illustrating that fault remains an implicit factor of liability for defective products under section 402A has
been the judicial reaction to the need to accommodate section 402A's
theory of liability with principles of comparative negligence when such
principles are adopted, either legislatively or judicially, in a particular
jurisdiction. Since contributory negligence is not a defense under section 402A, a logical way of dealing with the problem is simply to deny
the application of comparative negligence principles to actions based
upon that section.9 1 The difficulty, of course, is that such a view imposes a more intensive liability exposure upon an arguably less culpable
defendant. It hardly seems cricket to impose liability, undiscounted by
the plaintiffs contribution, upon defendants whose fault has not been
proved, while at the same time permitting defendants whose culpability
is undisputed to have their liability reduced by the amount of that contribution. 9 2 Most judges who have faced this problem have chosen to
permit the defendants to reduce their liability under section 402A by
whatever amounts may be attributable to the plaintiffs contributory
fault." Although this practice has not occurred without some criticism," it is clearly consistent with the thesis of this discussion that
despite the fact that the plaintiff need not prove negligence, an implicit

89. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
90. Id. at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
91. See Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L.
REV. 431, 442-44 (1978); Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The
Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 356 (1977).
92. The discrimination visited against innocent defendants under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402A and 520, who must pay out full recoveries to contributorily negligent
plaintiffs, whereas their culpable counterparts have the benefit of a setoff, has excited virtually no
attention. Davis, supra note 77, at 536.
93. E.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979);
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Other cases are collected at W. PROSSER, supra
note 6, at 819. See also Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability 40 LA. L. REV.
403, 406 (1980).
94. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 355, 579 P.2d 441, 448, 146
Cal. Rptr. 550, 557 (1978) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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assumption of blameworthiness underlies the so-called "strict" liability
under section 402A.
When all is said and done it may well be observed that this discussion and analysis merely restates the well-known historical association
between causation and moral responsibility, which is a touchstone of
many legal systems. Nevertheless, moral responsibility has certainly
not surfaced as a significant rationale for the modern theories of tort
recovery not based upon negligence, and a look at the most recent and
quite radical development in the product liability area-that of marketshare liability-bears this out.9
The problem which generated the solution provided by the marketshare liability theory is not new to the law of torts, although until quite
recently it manifested itself in rare but clearly identifiable instances."
The problem presented was that of a plaintiff with a sympathy-provoking injury inflicted by indisputably tortious conduct, but under circumstances in which it was impossible to identify which one of a discrete
number of defendants, one of whom must have been responsible, committed the act or created the condition. Since the problem so clearly
illustrates the inadequacies of the modern rules which place the burden
of establishing the negligent act and identifying the responsible party
on the plaintiff, it is one which law teachers and the editors of torts
casebooks find conspicuously engaging.98
The two leading decisions, Summers v. Tice" and Ybarra v. Spangard, °0° provide exceptions to the modern rules by permitting the plaintiffs to get to the jury without offering proof that any one of the defendants was more than likely the one responsible for the injury. This
exception to the otherwise applicable modern rules requiring the plaintiff to identify the defendant responsible for the injury has been called
"alternative liability," 10 ' and the mechanics of its application very

95. H. HART & A. HONORt, supra note 11, at 58, 64; Epstein, supra note 1, at 160-63. See
also the remarks of Justice Augustus Hand in Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510,
514 (2d Cir. 1931).
96. See Fischer, supra note 63.
97. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Ruud v. Grim, 252 Iowa 1266, 110
N.W.2d 321 (1961); Casey Pure Milk v. Booth Fisheries, 124 Minn. 117, 144 N.W. 450 (1913);
Moore v. Foster, 182 Miss. 15, 180 So. 73 (1938); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666

(1926).
98.

See, e.g., M.

MATERIALS ON TORTS

FRANKLIN

& R.

RABIN,

supra note 5, at 283-87; C.

GREGORY, CASES AND

260-61 (3d ed. 1977); W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 287-89.

99. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
100. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
101. "The principle is sometimes referred to as the 'alternative liability' theory." Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories Co., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 598, 607 P.2d 924, 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 (1980).

But this principle has questionable lineage. None of the three authorities frequently credited with
propounding it use the term "alternative liability." See Summers v. Tice. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d
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much resemble those necessary for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
apply. The main difference between the two is that res ipsa loquitur
relieves the plaintiff from having to identify which of several negligent
acts or omissions of the defendant might plausibly have caused the injury, whereas alternative liability relieves the plaintiff from having to
identify which of two or more equally involved defendants was more
than likely the perpetrator of the negligent act or omission.
As a practical matter, Ybarra v. Spangard is by far the more controversial of the two leading decisions because it combined both doctrines in a single case, thereby giving the plaintiff the best of both possible worlds. In that case the plaintiff, who had sustained injuries in a
hospital during a period in which he had been under anesthesia, was
permitted to submit his case to the jury without identifying which of
several equally eligible negligent acts had more than likely caused his
injury (res ipsa loquitur), and also without establishing which of a
number of sequentially involved defendants was more than likely the
102
person responsible for the act or omission (alternative liability).
When compared to the rules applied in Ybarra v. Spangard, market-share liability, as exemplified by the leading decision employing it,
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,0 3 appears to be a less radical innovation. This is because in most of the incidents arguably calling for the
application of the principles of market-share liability, there is little
doubt about how the injury occurred, a condition not clear in
Ybarra. °0 Market-share liability principles need not resolve ambiguities about how the injury occurred; instead, they simply deal with the
problem of the unidentified defendant by applying the principle of alternative liability with one significant addition. Those defendants whose
products can be shown to have been possible causes of the plaintiff's
injuries, and who are unable to show that they could not have caused
the injury, must assume liability in proportion to their relative shares of

1; Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687; RESTATEMENT

(SECON)

OF TORTS

§ 433B

(1965). The term was apparently first applied to describe this unique proof-shifting device in tort
law by the late Dean Prosser. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 243. Whether consciously or unconsciously, Dean Prosser carried over and applied to tort law a principle of agency law previously
unapplied in other fields. That principle forbids a double recovery from both principal and agent
on grounds of respondeat superior, and its classical exposition is found in Ewing v. Hayward, 50
Cal. App. 708, 717-18, 195 P. 970, 974 (1920) (Finlayson, J., concurring). Whether legitimate or
not, Dean Prosser's invention is apparently here to stay. In addition to the Sindell case, see Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593, 598 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Starling v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 187-88 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Namm v. Charles E. Frost & Co., 178 N.J.
Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App. Div. 1981) (refusing to apply the alternative liability theory and
questioning its propriety); Davis v. Yearwood, 612 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tenn. App. 1980).
102. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d at 687.
103. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
104.by See
supra text 1984
accompanying note 102.
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market patronage, rather than in accordance with the normal joint and
several liability rules."'
Market-share liability, in this light, is nothing more than another
example of the judicial capacity to achieve a fairer parity between injured persons and those arguably responsible by simply modifying the
rules governing the burden of proof. In Sindell this was accomplished
through the application of the principles of alternative liability, slightly
modified by adjusting the normal contribution rule followed in orthodox
cases of joint liability. But even under the controversial market-share
liability rules, there is at bottom, as has been shown, a premise of
moral responsibility which, in this instance, is a surrogate for proof of
causative fault.
VI.

ADVANTAGES

TO CONCEDING THAT ALL TORT LIABILITY

PRESUMES MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

A predictable response to the foregoing propositions might be that
the author has made a pedantic mountain out of a semantic molehill.
After all, whether we call it strict liability, liability without the need to
prove fault, or even the more ponderous "liability based upon a moral
responsibility inferred from a circumstantial involvement," the outcome
will be the same. Result-oriented judges are not, and need not be, picky

about the particular major premise necessary to validate their policy
judgments. Every legal realist knows this, and the movement towards
section 402A type liability has aptly been described as "strict liability
in search of a doctrine."' " The rebuttal has to be that the more accu-

rate we make our characterizations, the better we are prepared to understand what we are doing, and the better our ability to resolve the

problems which arise when the rules governing the shifting of losses are
changed or modified.
For example, the manifold difficulties which have beset judges in

determining the liability exposure of a product seller for a defect in
design 10 might have been avoided had we recognized, from the beginning, that the liability we were imposing was based upon an: assumption
of moral responsibility rather than the satisfaction of mei'ely neutral
conditions. Similarly, accommodating the principles of "strict" product
liability with the increasingly popular principles of comparative negligence would have been less painful and less complicated 0 8 had we conceded that behind the concept of "strict" product liability lay the no-

105.
106.

107.

See Fischer, supra note 63.
C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, supra note 1, at 584.
See Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability 33

551, 557-66 (1980).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
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tion of a socially unacceptable aberration. Moreover, in formulating
jury instructions in product liability cases, we would have been able to
provide our jurors with better guidance had we recognized that we
were dealing with unreasonable conditions or circumstances. Thus, instead of providing the jury with no guidance as to what is meant by a
"defective" product, the jury might well be instructed as follows:
[A] Your verdict must be for the plaintiff if you believe:
(1) defendant sold or leased the product in the course of the defendant's business; and
(2) the product was then defective; and
(3) plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of such defect. 1"
[B] The term "defect" as used in these instructions means a condition of
a product which makes it dangerous to person or property either because:
(1) some miscarriage in the manufacturing, processing, or repairing of the product rendered it different from other products of the
same line or type, or
(2) the product was designed in such a way that a reasonable person who knew or should have known of its harmful potential would
not have put it into the stream of commerce. 110
By the same token, if we had recognized that the rules of so-called
"traditional strict liability" as generated by such authorities as the de-

111 and the drafters of
cision in Rylands v. Fletcher,
the Restatement of
1
Torts " and the Restatement (Second) of Torts,118 were nothing more
than modified and isolated retentions of the rules formerly applicable in
what may be called the "pre-Brown v. Kendal 114 era," we might better

have integrated them into a general theory of tort liability, rather than
having to treat them as "anomalies" or exceptions to such a general
theory.
All of the ritual phrases incorporated into the formulas of tradi109. "Direct result" is designed to avoid the metaphysics of the expression "proximate
cause," a term which, if it were banished from judicial lexicons, would not be missed. See Vinson,
Proximate Cause Fog Spreads, 69 A.B.A. J. 1042 (1983). It is unfortunate, in this respect, that
Acting Chief Justice Tobriner used the term "proximately caused" in his otherwise admirable
formulation of the burden of proof dynamics in a design defect case. See supra text accompanying
notes 89-90.
110. The formulation rejects the so-called "hindsight" test which has caused undue controversy and has been the occasion of considerable confusion. See, e.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry
& Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design
Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593
(1980); Davison, The Uncertain Search for a Design Defect Standard, 30 Am. U.L. REv. 643,
668 (1981).
111. 3 L.R.-E. & 1. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
112. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1934).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
114.by60
Mass. (6 Cush.)
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tional strict liability utilize the notion of a departure from a norm established by societal expectations. In his opinion for the inferior Court
of Exchequer, in what ultimately became the decision in Rylands v.
Fletcher, Justice Blackburn declared that a "person who.., brings on
his lands . . . anything likely to do mischief if it escapes" is prima facie
answerable for the injuries which result.11 5 Upon appeal, Lord Cairns's
refinement of that test in the House of Lords employed the term "nonnatural" use, and declared that persons who made a "non-natural" use
of their land did so at their peril."" The original Restatement of Torts
used the unfortunate term "ultrahazardous" 117 to describe an activity
for which the defendant would be strictly liable, the intention being to
identify activities and conditions which were extremely and unusually
dangerous. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has recast that characterization in the term "abnormally dangerous." 11 8
Each one of these formulas embodies the same notion behind the
liability imposed at early common law under the writ of trespass vi et
armis, and it would seem that if the English jurists in Rylands v.
Fletcher had been faithful to the precedent of Scott v. Shepherd" (ignoring intervening circumstances affecting the conditions generated by
defendant's initial act), liability might have been imposed on that basis
without the need for the new and enchanting rationale which Rylands
generated. The main problem in Rylands may have been that the damage was the result of a condition created by the defendant rather than
an act, and that the damage was to land rather than to the person or to
chattels.1 20 Under those circumstances the action simply did not fit
within the traditional scope of trespass quare clausum fregit, trespass
12 1
vi et armis, or trespass on the case.
Curiously enough, these strict liability formulas also depend upon
the same talismans necessary for the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur: (1) an occurrence exciting social disapproval (e.g., dynamite explodes); (2) custody or intimate circumstantial involvement by
the defendant with the injury-producing activity (e.g., defendant stored
the dynamite); and (3) injuries of a type consistent with the social disapproval of the occurrence (e.g., substantial personal injuries or property damage of a foreseeable nature, rather than mink eating their
115.
116.

Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265, 279 (1866).
Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, 339 (1868).

117.
118.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1934).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519

119.
120.
reach and
REv. 184
121.

(1977).

96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1973); see supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 331-32. Even in England there are misgivings about the precise
meaning of the decision in Rylands. See Goodhart, Rylands v. Fletcher Today, 72 L.Q.
(1956).
See Malone, supra note 37, at 34-39.
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young). Like the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,122 all of these formulas
shift attention away from the defendant's conduct and make the paramount consideration the circumstances of the injury.128 But it is a mistake to assume that we have eliminated "fault" or "negligence" as an
implicit premise of liability. All we have removed is the need for the
plaintiff to prove a negligent act as a condition to a prima facie case.
A final observation on the curious schizophrenia which has afflicted thinking about tort liability over the past century may be in order. Euclidian geometry and Newtonian physics, when combined with
the rise of Darwinism in the late nineteenth century, suggested a universe whose workings were governed by scientific principles within the
comprehension and documentation capacity of the human intellect. At
the same time, Malthus, 12 4 Freud125 and Marx12 6 were developing highly persuasive theories about the human condition which tended to
downplay the idea of moral responsibility and to explain human behavior in terms of circumstances, incidents, and social conditions unrelated
to the exercise of moral choice. The keepers of the legal system
(judges, lawyers, and academics) may well have shared the intellectual
and philosophical ethos of that era. The search for simpler, more efficient, and seemingly less capricious mechanisms for dealing with recurring or statistically inevitable injury patterns was perhaps spurred by
that ethos.1 17 And to the extent that strict liability theories appear to
offer a less complicated and less discriminatory basis for compensating
bodily injury and property damage, the general enchantment with such
theories may also be explainable in terms of that same philosophical

122. Res ipsa loquitur builds upon the circumstances of the injury to infer a causal negligent act or omission, whereas in strict product liability the circumstances are assayed for the
purpose of inferring a defect. Compare Plato Reorganized School Dist. No. R-5 v. Intercounty
Elec. Coop., 425 S.W.2d 914 (Mo. 1968) with Winters v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 554 S.W.2d 565
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977). Both cases permitted recovery for fire damage resulting from an unexplained product ignition. The first was tried on a res ipsa loquitur theory, the second was tried on
a strict product liability theory. The parallels are striking. For a case in which the circumstances
were insufficient to provide an inference for either strict product liability or res ipsa loquitur, see
Brothers v. General Motors Corp., -Mont_., 658 P.2d 1108 (1983).
123. Davis, supra note 77, at 514; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973).
124. T. MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (1798).
125. L. TRILUNG, FREUD AND THE CRISIS OF OUR CULTURE (1955).
126. See P. PMLLIPS, MARX AND ENGELS ON LAW AND LAWS (1980).
127. The popularity and success of workers' compensation legislation is one of the more
remarkable results of the theory that compensation for recurring injury patterns should, in effect,
be "automated." See 1 New York Employers' Liability Commission, First Report (1916), summarized in W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 19-26 (1936). Other systems, based upon the workers' compensation idea have achieved considerable popularity. See, e.g.,
R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965); Ballantine, A
Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims. 29 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1916).
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milieu.1"' At the same time, one can see that a disenchantment with
notions of moral responsibility as a ground for loss shifting was moving
a number of leading jurists, including Holmes,1" 9 to search for more
scientific and objective bases for loss shifting. 30 Hence the preference
for the seemingly more mechanical and objective tests of so-called
"strict liability."
Einstein and Bohr, among others, have shown us the limitations of
Euclidian geometry and Newtonian physics."'1 Today the universe appears infinitely more complex and unknowable than it did during the
closing years of the nineteenth century. This should give us reason to
be cautious about assuming that there is some more accurate, efficient,
and socially acceptable mechanism for shifting losses than one
grounded in moral responsibility. While economic considerations which
deal with cost distribution and safety incentives are extremely important factors in loss-shifting decisions, they should be ancillary to the
moral judgment issue and not, as some distinguished scholars would
have it,13 2 preemptive.

VII. CONCLUSION
Holmes once said that the life of the law is experience, not logic.' 3 3
I believe that the experience of the twentieth century shows that it is
impossible fully to eliminate moral responsibility as a fundamental ba3
sis for loss shifting, no matter how often we rephrase the formulas.' 4

128. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Malone, This Brave New World-A Review of "Negligence Without Fault," 25
S. CAL. L. REV. 14 (1951).
129. Holmes clearly believed that mechanical rules should be distilled for the purpose of
determining when liability should be shifted, and that a jury should be used only in those constantly shrinking circumstances where the rule of conduct has not previously been declared. O.W.
HOLMES, supra note 18, at 123-35; Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
130. Professor Jeffrey O'Connell is clearly the most colorful and engaging apologist for a
system which awards compensation purely on the basis of the circumstantial origins of the injury,
and with recoveries reduced by whatever amounts the economic feasibility of the compensation
system requires. See O'Connell, supra note 4; Fischer, ProductsLiability-FunctionallyImposed
Strict Liability, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 93 (1979) (collecting citations to many of Professor
O'Connell's books and articles on the subject). But Professor O'Connell has some distinguished
predecessors. See. e.g., P. FRENCH, THE AUTOMOBILE COMPENSATION PLANS (1933); Ballantine,
A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1916); Smith, Sequel to Workmen's CompensationAct, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235 (1913). See also Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774
(1967).
131. R. MOORE, NIELS BOHR: THE MAN, His SCIENCE AND THE WORLD THEY CHANGED
(1966); P. MICHELMORE, EINSTEIN: PROFILE OF THE MAN (1962).
132. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
133. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 18, at 1.
134. The one major exception to the view that some level of moral responsibility underlies
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What we are really doing is attempting to maintain a fundamental parity between those who sustain losses and those who carry on the activities which are the occasion of such losses. Although frequently disguised in terms of doctrinal alternatives that seem to eliminate the
element of moral responsibility, the parity between loss inflicters and
loss sustainers is in fact maintained by shifts in the burden of proof,
which may direct attention away from the fundamental premises of liability, but which do not significantly change them.

all loss shifting mechanisms is the New Zealand system providing public compensation for all
personal injuries, however caused or inflicted. Henderson, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform, 48 U. CH1. L. REV. 781 (1981); G. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY
(1979); Dahl, Injury Compensationfor Everyone?-The New Zealand Experience. 53 J. URB. L.
925 (1976); Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First Two Years, 25 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1 (1977). But that system operates under unique circumstances and conditions and is a
subject for a different time and a different place.
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